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Does Russia has the Possibilities 
to Diversify Its Export Potential 
to Manage the Power Engineering 
(For Example, Nuclear Power 
Development)?
Kozlov Viktor
Abstract
The article analyzes the current state of power engineering, nuclear power, and 
their role in ensuring energy independence of Russia. According to the author, 
the creation of large high-tech integrated companies with active innovation state 
practice can bring the Russian economy to a higher level of development. To 
maintain Russia’s leading role in the construction of nuclear power plants abroad, 
according to the author, it is necessary to optimize cost and terms of construction of 
projects, improve designs, increase scopes and quality of specialists’ training, and 
fight corruption.
Keywords: improvement of management structure, national security, energy 
independence, import substitution, structural transformation, large integrated 
structures
1. Introduction
The situation in which turned out to be power engineering of Russia in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century has generated heated debate about the causes of 
the crisis, which turned out to be a domestic machine building, as well as ways to 
overcome it [1–3, 8].
The fact that the structural transformation in the Russian machine-building 
complex, which took place at the time, was associated with a number of assump-
tions and trends largely determines the prospects for the formation of new and 
operation of the existing large integrated structure.
Meeting the challenges, which national engineering faces, is impossible with 
outraising capital in the sector, experiencing an investment “hunger.” This applies 
to power engineering as well—a relatively prosperous industry, which was in the 
period of sharp decline in the domestic demand for machinery and equipment to go 
out of the crisis of the 1990s due to export orders with less losses than other engi-
neering enterprises. However, the chronic underinvestment caused reducing the 
technical level of its production facilities.
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It is necessary to focus on all resources—financial, industrial, and intellectual 
ones for implementation of large-scale tasks by the industry, and that in turn will 
require improving the management structure.
In the 1980s of the last century, the equipment supplies by power engineering 
provided the annual commissioning of at least 10 million kWh of electric power.
However, since 1991, there has been a sharp production decline in the industry, 
as evidenced by the data on manufacture of steam turbines and boilers, commis-
sioning of generating facilities at the thermal power plants of Russia in 1990–2000, 
and the lack of orders for manufacturing NPP and HPP equipments [5].
“The strategy of development of power engineering of Russia,” elaborated on 
the basis of the “Russian Energy Strategy till 2030” approved by the Government 
of the Russian Federation (hereinafter—the Energy Strategy), reflects the funda-
mental directions of development of power engineering in Russia and contains the 
practical measures for their effective implementation.
2. The current problems
The availability in Russia of its own effective power engineering is one of the 
pillars of its national security, power independence.
According to the official data, the equipment in the power industry is currently 
worn by almost 60%. This means that more than half of the thermal and hydro-
power plants operate under high risk. Given the strategic line of the state for import 
substitution, it is necessary to organize the process of updating the equipment in 
the way when orders are placed with the Russian companies, and that is possible if 
there are investments into domestic engineering.
Describing power engineering competitiveness, we note the peculiar feature of 
the domestic energy sector, which consists in the fact that almost all power plants 
in Russia (and CIS) are equipped with the equipment of domestic production. 
However, modernization and mobilization of resources in the sector can only be 
based on the policy of concentrating resources, pooling of capital, and formation of 
the effective management system. In other words, it is about solving the problem of 
creation of modern organizational structures.
Industrial policy in power engineering should be focused on the process of 
system management of its activities. Products of this sector meet the needs of other 
sectors of the economy as a technological component of such specific product as 
energy. This means that manufacture of machines and mechanisms in the power 
engineering industry is inseparably linked with construction and engineering 
works, which provide the necessary conditions for its operation.
The volume of this work is significant even in cases when the equipment is sup-
plied for modernization of the existing facilities, rather than for equipping of new 
construction projects. And the technological chain of “design—manufacture—con-
struction—installation—commissioning—operation” implies such requirements 
for all participants of the process of equipment commercial commissioning, the 
specifics of which do not allow “third-party” participants to participate in this chain 
(except for civil works at the facilities of power infrastructure).
Thus, the logic of the process of improving quality of the products and activities 
related to design, manufacture, installation, and commissioning of the equipment, 
as well as reducing the time for putting power units in operation requires co-opera-
tion of specialists of different branches within the same structure.
In fact, this principle was previously implemented in the framework of  
the branch management system. Within the USSR Ministry of Energy, about  
half the staff was engaged in the manufacture of power equipment, the other 
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half—in the construction of power facilities. However, in the period of market 
reforms, the branch management system was destroyed, and privatized enterprises 
became independent market participants. But no one, even a very large factory, is 
able to meet the needs in power engineering products, given the specificity of these 
high-tech goods.
The thing is that high technologies require coordination of activities of repre-
sentatives of different trades, professions, and industries. Especially in the frame 
of globalization when the tone is set precisely by those companies that represent a 
major conglomerate that combines research and production structures, as well as 
structures promoting products on the world market, global high-tech companies. 
Exactly these companies are able to bring the Russian economy to a different path 
of development, when export of high-tech products will be no less weighty than 
export of mineral resources. But none Russian factory, no matter how large it may 
be, is a global company; therefore, it is not competitive in world markets. Therefore, 
effective restructuring of production and management is necessary in the condi-
tions of independence of market agents under insufficiency of the branch coordina-
tion system.
The process of integration of these structures, allowing to centralize devel-
opment strategies and improve management and technological cooperation, will 
be inevitably hampered by problems of redistribution of property, as the system 
of securing property rights existing in Russia can be effective only if the owner 
is really controlling activities of all participants of the association, provided 
by significant proportion of ownership of assets. Given the fact that in the 
process of mass privatization there was no task to create an effective manage-
ment system of high-tech industries, which are characterized by a high degree 
of co-ordination and co-operation of complex productions, formation of global 
companies will inevitably affect the property interests, resulting in a secondary 
redistribution of property. Thus, corporate conflicts are inevitable in structural 
transformation.
Structural transformations in the Russian machine-building complex are linked 
with a number of assumptions and trends, largely determining the prospects for 
formation of new and operation of the existing large integrated structures.
First, the experience of formation of large associated industrial structures 
accumulated in the Soviet times, unfortunately, was not properly developed further. 
However, foreign large industrial conglomerates were formed not only based on the 
experience of the Soviet industry but also based on the methodological basics that 
had been tested in the USSR.
Second, the Soviet machinery represented a hypertrophied form of simple 
cooperation of the universal enterprises but with huge potential unique possibilities 
for development. However, this potential was not even used, but, in fact, lost, in 
connection with the influence of accelerated privatization and breaking of the state 
management.
Third, the breach of economic ties and collapse of the industry management sys-
tem in the process of privatization caused dominance of partnerships as a protective 
reaction, which are based on informal contract practices, affecting not only the 
process of exchange of goods but also property relations.
Fourth, the property relations established under incomplete legal frame work, 
regulating property relations, formed a specific model of partnership based on a 
system of trust relationships with contractors and the state authorities. At the same 
time, there were quite wide spread manifestations of economic self-interest in all 
aspects of the economic life, including the processes of disintegration (integration) 
of industrial enterprises. The new management was formed, which core compe-
tence were take over and redistribution of property.
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Fifth, the dynamics of development was influenced not only by selfish holders 
of economic power but also by competitive strategies of foreign companies who 
sought to oust domestic producers from the world markets using domestic manag-
ers. However, where the owners could find a common language, a new type of 
engineering companies appeared, which competitiveness was high enough not only 
in the domestic but also in the foreign markets. As for the numerous cases of col-
lapse of structures, those, as a rule, were associated with numerous contradictions 
just due to the system of partnership [6].
Thus, the corporate conflicts cannot be considered solely from a negative point 
of view: they are unavoidable in the process of consolidation of the technological 
chains belonging to different owners; moreover, replacing the owner does not 
always result in changing mismanagement by even more inefficient.
Implementation of major projects in the Russian power sector solves a whole 
range of important social and economic problems, provides employment, increases 
filling of regional budgets, allows to solve strategic tasks of further increase of 
the installed generating capacity, and increases global competitiveness of Russian 
equipment in particular and of Russian high-tech in general.
Large integrated structures should be active participants in the process of 
implementation of integrated innovations. In a sense, they act both as mechanisms 
of social partnership, on the one hand, expressing consolidated opinion of a large 
group of people involved in the manufacture of industry products, and on the 
other—as structures that implement decisions of the central government concern-
ing the interests of large social groups. In addition, the large integrated structures 
are able to participate in development of complex innovation programs, including 
initiation of consideration of a number of issues by the state.
In the years 2004–2005 GAZPROM, following the recommendations of the 
higher state authorities acquired shares of ATOMSTROYEXPORT, actual monopoly 
in NPP construction abroad, and of the Incorporated Engineering Company (until 
2004, a controlling stake in these companies was in the hands of K. Bendukidze, 
private entrepreneur). These actions of the state demonstrated that the corporation 
model, similar to that of the firm AREVA (France) was selected, with a majority 
stake owned by the state, as opposed to the corporation “General Electric,” USA, 
which is owned by private capital [3, 7].
When Sergei Kiriyenko (1998—Prime Minister) came to ROSATOM of RF in 
2005, the Agency elaborated a program of accelerated development of nuclear power 
in Russia [4]. This program was submitted to the government on May 18, 2006, and 
reported to Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, who approved the 
program and plan of priority measures for its implementation in June 2006.
In the development of these solutions, more than 6 billion dollars for imple-
mentation of this program were allocated in the budget. In accordance with this 
program, Russian NPPs should produce about 25% of the total electric power by 
2030.
The nuclear industry can play an important role in solving the energy problem 
both in Russia and in the world. It is necessary to build and put into operation 40 
GW of nuclear power units on the territory of the Russian Federation by 2030, and 
in other states, the Russian nuclear specialists will be able to claim the orders of 
40–60 GW in the same period of time.
According to the forecasts of ROSATOM of RF by 2030, nuclear power in the 
world will grow up to 300–600 GW. Up to half of this promising market will be 
closed for external players, and the Russian nuclear specialist scan actually qualifies 
for 20–25% of orders (40–60 GW) of the remaining 200–300 GW of available access.
In the global nuclear fuel market, the share of Russia is now 45%. The Russian 
should be 50% in the markets of the USA and Canada, 42% in Europe, 35% in South 
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Korea, 30% in Latin America, and 10% in China and Japan. To maintain its leader-
ship, Russia has to increase capacities and implement market reforms in the sector [8].
3. Main problems that complicate the industry activities
3.1 Personnel policy and personnel training
There is no enough qualified personnel for safe operation of commissioned 
NPPs. The today’s current system of personnel training and consolidation in the 
nuclear industry is clearly insufficient for its large-scale development. Working 
pensioners make about 25%, young workers and specialists—about 10%. 
Acquisition of knowledge and skills should be ahead of programs for designing and 
development of technologies, construction of nuclear facilities, and their com-
missioning. The current situation with the staff can be considered critical. With 
a general decline in the number of researchers (the driving force of innovation 
development), the share of researchers over the age of 60 years increases. The aver-
age age of leading industry experts (PhD) and university professors of “nuclear” 
profile is higher than the average male life expectancy in the country. Although over 
the past 6 years, ROSATOM has done much to address the deficiencies in training. 
The corporate university of 20 schools was formed on the basis of MEPI [9, 10].
3.2  Long-term construction of nuclear power plants and unreasonably 
overpriced construction
The long-term construction period further increases the cost and opportunities 
for corruption. Building “from scratch” actually takes at least 7 years, indicating 
shortcomings in designing and imperfect work organization.
ROSATOM stated its desire to achieve the construction time of 4–4.5 years. To do 
this, it is necessary to unify designs and implement innovative construction tech-
niques based on large-block equipment supplies to construction sites.
The declared cost of 1 GW of nuclear generation has already reached $4 billion 
(or $4.6 billion for power unit of 1.15 GW) and continues to grow. Today the cost 
of NPP construction in Russia is two times higher than in China and for 30–40% 
higher than in Europe.
In the current environment, the economically justified cost of construction of 
one VVER unit of 1.15 GW capacity is not more than $2.5 billion with the construc-
tion term not more than 5 years. If ROSATOM is not able to meet these indicators, 
the NPP construction in the country is not competitive compared with moderniza-
tion of steam turbine power units to combined cycle ones at the existing gas TPP 
according to the main criteria—volume of replaced gas per year during electricity 
generation and its net cost. The unreasonably high cost of NPP construction 
includes not less than 40% of the corruption component.
3.3 Electricity tariffs
The current regulated price of electricity at the Russian NPPs on the whole sale 
market is 3.2 US cents per kW/h (for comparison, in the USA—1.87 cents, in France 
and Germany—2–2.2 cents in 2008 prices). The price of electricity for economic 
entities in Russia is 2–3 rubles or 7–10 cents, and a new connection of consumers 
reaches 4.5–5 rubles or 15–17 cents (for comparison, in the USA—6.5–7.5 cents, the 
average price in the EU—12 cents, in China—8–9 cents). With regard to nuclear 
engineering, the situation is ambiguous. On the one hand, at the moment, there is 
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possibility of producing the necessary long lead equipment for no more than three 
nuclear power units per year, which is obviously not enough for realization of the 
ambitious plans to build nuclear power plants in Russia and abroad. On the other 
hand, the large-scale modernization is currently carried out at the key enterprises 
of the energy sector of the country [6, 11].
In general, our analysis shows that in order to achieve its goals by 2030 at home 
and abroad, ROSATOM of RF needs to complete all the plans to modernize the 
machine-building enterprises in a relatively short period of time. This will allow 
achieving the range and scope of manufactured products to the desired level of 4–5 
sets of key equipment for NPP units per year. However, given the fact that currently 
active negotiations are held or bidding procedures are already ongoing concerning 
construction of a large number of nuclear power units in a number of countries 
(Czech Republic, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and others), 
more significant increase of national nuclear engineering capabilities may be 
required in the medium term.
To perform such wide-ranging task, it is necessary for ROSATOM of RF, at least, 
first of all to eliminate the disadvantages mentioned above and to pay special atten-
tion to three main areas.
The first main area is the completion of the package of administrative docu-
ments, which provide activities of enterprises of the industry and regulate the 
relations between the industry and the state authorities. The package of administra-
tive documents also includes a set of more than 20 departmental purpose-oriented 
programs, and, of course, it includes improvement of ROSATOM structure.
The second key area is the knowledge management. It is clear that it is the 
high-tech industry in that all technological solutions are based on a sufficiently 
large block of scientific, engineering, and methodological knowledge. And vari-
ous kinds of dysfunctions and failures take place without some technologization 
of knowledge generation, handling, and storage. For example, the knowledge is 
not standardized—it means that different participants of the process are based on 
different data. The knowledge was generated but not used in practice—hence, there 
is necrosis of investments in R&D. Developments were made but not commercially 
used—hence, there are losses in the financial sector and lack of a sufficient set 
of secondary developments, in which the results of major research programs are 
applied that have been made previously.
The third major area is the cost management. ROSATOM has been traditionally 
occupied in collecting data on the economy of enterprises in the industry, their 
processing, analysis both for planning of ROSATOM activities and in the interests 
of monitoring economic, financial activities of the enterprises, preparation of bal-
ance commissions, and so on. At present, this work must be carried out consistently 
for a radical reduction in the construction cost.
3.4 Another important
Substantiation of NPP construction calculation based on needs in power capaci-
ties, including the regional context, analysis of the grid condition in order to justify 
NPP connection to the general layout of power facilities by 2030.
4. Findings
The state of the national economy significantly affects the nature and methods 
of corporate management. This suggests the existence of specific corporate manage-
ment models for each country. Thus, the formation of the corporate management 
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national model in Russia takes place under conditions of incomplete development 
of the legal framework and uncertainty of ownership of privatized property, with 
nonexecution of the existing laws on protection of property rights and dominance 
of the insider control model in joint stock companies.
Thus, the problem of corporate management, which is not a purely national 
one, is of particular importance in the global trends. That is because the integra-
tion processes in the national high-tech sectors are characterized by the tendency 
of “winding-down” of internal competition in order to accumulate resources for 
external expansion. Therefore, the national integrated structures are involved in 
global competition, in which those benefit who are able to provide customers with 
the most comprehensive volume of services in comparison with competitors.
5. Conclusion
With regard to the real possibilities of the modern Russian nuclear power, 
it must be noted that over the past 15 years, five power units were constructed 
and put in operation abroad—in China, India, and Iran. After the long years 
of suspension in construction of nuclear power plants, ATOMSTROYEXPORT 
became the first company among its competitors, which handed over high power 
nuclear units complying with all safety requirements to a foreign customer. Thus, 
ATOMSTROYEXPORT proved to the world that the companies and organizations 
that make up the core of the nuclear power industry in Russia have sufficient poten-
tial and real resources to implement the most complex and demanding nuclear 
power projects [6].
In 2016, the assets of ASE Group companies (ATOMSTROYEXPORT)—the 
Engineering division of the State Atomic Energy Corporation ROSATOM, a lead-
ing player in the global market for the design and construction of nuclear energy 
facilities, were finally integrated. The Engineering division is well known to our 
foreign partners. Since its foundation, it has a reputation as an effective provider of 
the engineering services and has gained trust in the global market.
6. In 2018, the foreign portfolio exceeded 90 billion US dollars
By decision of the State Atomic Energy Corporation ROSATOM, the Engineering 
division became the Industry competence center for the management of capital 
construction projects.
For several years, the project management practice has been successfully 
implemented by ASE. The unique Multi-D technology continues to develop, being a 
main tool of the project management platform, which allows shortening construc-
tion time and improving labor productivity, work quality, and safety while reducing 
project costs. In 2016, this technology received international recognition as a winner 
in the WNEAWARDS competition (Le Bourget, France) presenting the “Project 
Management System Based on Multi-D Technologies,” and that is a witness of great 
recognition from the world energy community. The “Multi-D® Project Management 
System at the Rostov NPP” won the international CEL AWARD-2016 contest in the 
“Megaproject” nomination, announced by FIATECH, one of the most respected 
industrial associations worldwide.
In addition, ASE Group companies became the first Russian company to receive 
an international certificate of conformity with the third competency class in the 
field of project, program, and portfolio management according to the International 
Project Management Association (IPMA Delta) model. This is another achievement 
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internationally. Currently, certification in the field of project management accord-
ing to the international IPMA standards has been passed by all top managers of the 
company. The division will continue to implement its strategic goals in the difficult 
situation of growing competition both in the NPP construction market and in the 
market for construction management services for the complex engineering facili-
ties, using all resources to increase competitiveness.
Based on the successfully constructed five power units (in China, India, and 
Iran), the following areas of cooperation abroad are being implemented.
6.1 China
The second phase of the Tianwan NPP (TAES-2), which also includes two units 
with VVER-1000 reactors under the NPP-91 design, is being constructed in accor-
dance with the General Contract for units 3 and 4 of TAES-2, signed in 2010, and 
entered into force in 2011. The Russian side has obligations to develop the complete 
engineering and operation designs of the Nuclear Island (NI) for TAES-2 units 3 
and 4, providing the related services. ASE JSC also undertakes the overall technical 
responsibility for the design of units 3 and 4, is responsible for managing interfaces 
throughout the project, and provides warranty obligations.
The General Contract provides for commissioning of unit 3 in February 2018 
and unit 4 in December 2018. All activities were going on schedule.
On December 30, 2017, power was launched at unit 3.
It is planned to bring the number of Russian power units in China to 8.
6.2 Iran
The implementation of the Bushehr-1 NPP project made it possible to sign the 
Protocol to the Intergovernmental Agreement of 08.25.1992 in 2014, which provides 
for the possibility to construct eight NPP units in Iran.
At the same time, on November 11, 2014, the Contract was signed under which 
ATOMSTROYEXPORT will construct the second and third power units of the 
Bushehr NPP. On September 10, 2016, the solemn laying of the “first stone” took 
place. The start of activities under the Contract was scheduled on December 28, 
2016, when the Russian side received an advance from the Iranian customer.
During 2017, work was carried out to prepare the site. On March 14, 2001, the 
earthworks were started on the Bushehr-2 NPP site. On October 31, 2017, a cer-
emony was held to begin activities at the foundation pit of the main buildings of 
power unit 2. In 2018, engineering and geological surveys of the marine area and the 
site for spillway facilities were planned.
It was planned to coordinate the Bushehr-2 NPP design with the Customer and 
begin procedures related to the examination and obtaining a license for construc-
tion from the Iranian regulator. For 2018, completion of the pit for power unit 3 was 
scheduled, and for 2019—the “first concrete” at power unit 2. In accordance with 
the Contract, provisional acceptance of unit 2 is planned in 2026, of unit 3—in 2027.
6.3 India
Under the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the 
Government of the Republic of India on cooperation in the construction of additional 
nuclear power units at the Kudankulam site, as well as in the construction of nuclear 
power plants under the Russian designs at new sites in the Republic of India, dated 
December 5, 2008, the parties started the project realization plan for construction of 
power units 3 and 4 of the Kudankulam NPP with VVER-1000 MW reactor units each.
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On October 4, 2014, the General Framework Agreement (GFA) was signed for 
construction of the Kudankulam NPP power units 3 and 4. In June 2017, the first 
concrete was poured at the second phase of the Kudankulam NPP unit 3, in October 
2017—unit 4.
The planned start date for warranty operation of power units 3 and 4 is 2023 and 
2024, respectively.
On June 1, 2017, ATOMSTROYEXPORT JSC and the Indian Atomic Energy 
Corporation signed the General Framework Agreement for the construction of the 
third phase of the Kudankulam NPP, and the Intergovernmental Credit Protocol 
necessary for implementation of the project was also signed. The Agreement pro-
vides for the construction of the third phase of the Kudankulam NPP power units 
5 and 6 under the Russian design. On July 31, 2017, Contracts were signed between 
ATOMSTROYEXPORT JSC and the Indian Atomic Energy Corporation (IAEC) for 
the priority design activities and detailed design and supply of basic equipment 
for the third phase of the Kudankulam NPP. The planned first concrete for power 
units 5 and 6 is 2019 and 2020, respectively. Planned dates for the start of warranty 
operation of power units 5 and 6 are 2025 and 2026, respectively.
6.4 Bangladesh
On December 25, 2015, ATOMSTROYEXPORT JSC and the Bangladesh Atomic 
Energy Commission signed the General Contract for the construction of the Ruppur 
NPP consisting of 1200 MW two power units under NPP-2006 design, including a 
number of Appendices thereto. The signing of the General Contract was a fundamen-
tal event that allowed to start activities at the main stage of the plant construction.
In accordance with the agreement of the parties, the entry into force of the 
General Contract depended from fulfillment of a number of conditions. The first 
was signing of a credit intergovernmental agreement for the main construction 
period of the Ruppur NPP, then signing of Appendices to the General Contract, 
obtaining a license by the Bangladesh party for the NPP site and approval of the 
selected NPP design by the Bangladesh regulatory body.
On July 26, 2016, the Intergovernmental Agreement was signed on allocation of 
the state loan to finance, the main stage of the Ruppur NPP construction.
Simultaneously with the fulfillment of the conditions for the entry into force of 
the General Contract, in 2016 significant work was done to coordinate and prepare 
for signing the related integration Contracts for the Ruppur NPP project, in particu-
lar, the Contract for supply of nuclear fuel, the Contract for technical assistance for 
operation, service, and technical maintenance, and repair of the Ruppur NPP.
In March 2017, the parties agreed and initialed the Intergovernmental 
Agreement Draft on spent nuclear fuel management at the Ruppur NPP. It was 
planned to prepare an agreement for signing as soon as possible.
ATOMSTROYEXPORT JSC is completing the construction and installation 
activities at the preliminary facilities and construction and installation base. 
In 2016, under the General Contract, the working documentation for the main 
construction period was developed, as well as the materials justifying the licenses 
for location and construction of power units 1 and 2 of the Ruppur NPP. The first 
concrete is planned for 2017. Commissioning of the first unit of the Ruppur NPP is 
scheduled for 2022, and of the second unit—for 2023.
6.5 Hungary
History: The Hungarian-Russian cooperation in the field of nuclear energy 
has more than 60 years. It began in 1955 with signing of the Agreement to make 
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a research reactor in Budapest. On December 28, 1966, the Intergovernmental 
Agreement was signed between Hungary and the Soviet Union on construction of 
the first nuclear power plant in Hungary. Currently, the Paks NPP with four VVER-
440 units is successfully operating, providing more than 50% of the country's 
electricity.
On January 14, 2014, the Intergovernmental Agreement between Russia and 
Hungary was signed in Moscow on cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy, which envisages the construction of two new Paks-2 NPP units.
On December 9, 2014, the Hungarian MVM Paks-2 JSC and the Russian NIAEP 
JSC (ASE EC JSC since December 2016) signed three Agreements regarding the 
construction of two NPP units with VVER-1200 Russian reactors:
• EPC—the Contract (engineering, equipment supply, and construction) for two 
new power units, in which the tasks for the next 10 years are fixed, taking into 
account the physical launch of the first unit in 2023, of the second—in 2025;
• the Contract that governs the terms of service for future power units; and
• the Contract on the conditions of long-term fuel supply.
In April 2015, the approval procedure by the EURATOM Commission for the 
Contract on supply of nuclear fuel for new units of the Paks-2 NPP was successfully 
completed.
On February 17, 2015, during the visit of the President of the Russian Federation 
Vladimir Putin to Hungary, the Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between the State Atomic Energy Corporation ROSATOM and the Ministry of 
Social Resources of Hungary on training of personnel in the field of nuclear energy 
and related areas. According to the document, the parties will carry out coopera-
tion in the field of education and training of personnel, educational, and scientific 
activities, as well as in joint educational programs in nuclear energy and related 
fields.
In June 2015, NIAEP JSC (ASE EC JSC since December 2016) and MVM Paks-2 
JSC signed all necessary Appendices for opening financing for the EPC Contract, 
which stipulate the time schedule, procedure and terms of payments, and insurance 
conditions.
Hungary, as a member of the European Union, was obliged to carry out a total 
of five notification and conciliation procedures with the European Commission 
in connection with implementation of the Paks-2 NPP expansion project. In 
November 2016, the European Commission completed the expertise of the Paks-2 
nuclear power plant construction project, removing all obstacles to its further 
development. In March 2017, construction of the new Paks-2 nuclear power units in 
Hungary was approved by the European Commission (EC).
The parties are developing the construction time schedule. It is planned that 
the license for construction of the Paks-2 NPP will be ready in 2019, and the first 
concrete will be poured in 2020. The peak of construction work is expected in 
2021–2022. The nuclear island and the primary circuit are the responsibility of the 
General Contractor, while other works are carried out on procurement.
The main task of 2017 was preparation for the Paks-2 NPP construction. The 
scope of tasks includes preparation of engineering documentation, cooperation with 
suppliers, and application for a building license. As a part of the activities related to 
preparation of the documentation necessary to obtain licenses for the Paks-2 NPP 
construction, the technical design for 5 and 6 units, the preliminary safety analysis 
report (PSAR), and the probabilistic safety analysis reports are being prepared.
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ATOMPROEKT JSC, the General Designer is completing work on the conceptual 
design documents that precede development of the design documentation and is 
also completing adaptation of the VVER-1200 base design, agreed with the Paks-2 
MVM Customer, to the specific conditions of the Paks site. The process of develop-
ing chapters of the PSAR and sections of the technical design is ongoing.
The announcement of the first tender procedures has begun. Competitive 
information will be available on the specialized platform for ROSATOM tenders. 
Tender notices will also be widely published on the relevant Hungarian and inter-
national sites. All tender documentation will be posted in English. The Hungarian 
and other European companies can take part in procurement related to almost the 
entire process of the NPP construction, from design and construction to equipment 
supplies (except for the primary equipment that requires very specific knowledge 
and competencies) and related services (legal, translation, etc.).
Prospects for cooperation. In the future, when implementing the project for the 
Paks-2 NPP construction, all purchases of the necessary equipment and services 
will be carried out openly and transparently in accordance with European Union 
standards. As potential suppliers of equipment and services, all interested com-
panies, including those from EU countries, can equally participate in tenders. The 
Russian side expects significant participation of the firms from Hungary, so that the 
level of localization, i.e., local industry participation, will amount to 40%.
Requirements for suppliers are different, depending on what they supply or 
what services they provide.
6.6 Egypt
The El Dabaa NPP (Egypt), which includes four units with VVER-1200 reac-
tors, is being constructed in accordance with the EPC Contract, which was signed 
between ATOMSTROYEXPORT JSC and the Department of Nuclear Plants of the 
Arab Republic of Egypt on December 31, 2016 and entered into force on December 
11, 2017. The project provides for construction of four power units of 1.2 GW capac-
ity with VVER-1200 MW reactor (water-to-water power reactor) according to the 
Russian design. The Russian side will also assist the Egyptian partners in developing 
nuclear infrastructure, supply the Russian nuclear fuel for the entire life cycle of 
the nuclear power plant, build a special storage facility and supply containers for 
storing spent nuclear fuel, increase the level of localization, provide training for 
national personnel, and support the Egyptian partners in operation and mainte-
nance of the El Dabaa NPP during the first 10 years of the plant’s operation.
In accordance with the EPC Contract, the first power unit of the El Dabaa NPP 
will be commissioned in 2026.
6.7 Turkey
The Intergovernmental Agreement of the Russian Federation and Turkey on 
cooperation in the field of construction and operation of the nuclear power plant  
on the Akkuyu site in the Mersin province on the south coast of Turkey was signed 
on May 12, 2010.
The Akkuyu NPP project includes four power units of the Russian VVER-1200 
3+ generation reactors. The capacity of each NPP unit will be 1200 MW. The design 
solutions of the Akkuyu NPP meet all modern requirements of the world nuclear 
community and established by the IAEA safety standards, the International nuclear 
security advisory group, and the requirements of the EUR Club.
The start of commercial operation of the Akkuyu NPP units 1–4 was tentatively 
scheduled for April 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026, respectively.
Nuclear Power Plant
12
6.8 Finland
On October 5, 2011, the construction site of a new nuclear power plant in 
Finland was announced: it will be Hanhikivi Cape in the community (municipal-
ity) of the Pyhäjoki Province, Northern Ostrobothnia (on the coast of the Gulf of 
Bothnia, about 100 km south of Oulu). In the media, there are various names of 
this plant—the Pyuhäjoki NPP, the Hanhikivi NPP, the Hanhikivi-1 NPP, but the 
official name is the Hanhikivi-1 NPP. It was originally planned that construction 
of the plant would begin in 2015, and the plant would be launched in 2020, and its 
maximum capacity would be 1800 MW. Initially, the negotiations were held with 
the companies Areva and Toshiba.
On July 3, 2013, the Finnish company Fennovoima Oy and Rusatom Overseas 
CJSC, a subsidiary of the Russian State Corporation ROSATOM, signed the 
Agreement to develop the design in order to prepare for signing of the Contract for 
the plant construction. It was planned that this Contract would be signed before the 
end of 2013. In September 2014, the Finnish government approved the NPP con-
struction project with the participation of Russia, envisaging the use of the Russian 
VVER-1200 reactor. The plant should be built by 2024.
6.9 Belarus
In the Republic of Belarus, at the Ostrovets site near the city of Grodno, the 
construction of the Belarusian NPP consisting of VVER-1200 two power units with 
the total capacity of up to 2400 (2 × 1200) MW is underway. The obligations of the 
General Contractor are assigned to ASE JSC. It is envisaged that the Belarusian NPP 
is being constructed on the basis of the full “turnkey” responsibility of the General 
Contractor. The “NPP-2006” design, the General Designer is ATOMPROEKT JSC, 
was chosen for construction of the first Belarusian NPP.
The Belarusian NPP design complies with all international standards and IAEA 
recommendations and is characterized by the enhanced safety characteristics, 
technical, and economic indicators.
The main advantages of the Russian design are a high degree of security pro-
vided through the use of the independent channels of active and passive safety 
systems, the melt trap, and other systems. Unit 1 of the plant is planned to be com-
missioned in 2019, unit 2—in 2020.
The great prospects imply an even greater responsibility. The previous story, now 
of the ASE Group companies, allows to hope for successful implementation, I am not 
afraid of the word, of the grandiose tasks, by the nuclear power industry of Russia!
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